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Abstract
Background: Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations. In indirect
reciprocity, an individual is motivated to help another to acquire a good reputation and receive help from others
afterwards. Another aspect of human cooperation is ingroup favoritism, whereby individuals help members in
their own group more often than those in other groups. Ingroup favoritism is a puzzle for the theory of
cooperation because it is not easily evolutionarily stable. In the context of indirect reciprocity, ingroup favoritism
has been shown to be a consequence of employing a double standard when assigning reputations to ingroup and
outgroup members. An example of such a double standard is the situation in which helping an ingroup member
is regarded as good, whereas the same action toward an outgroup member is regarded as bad.
Results: We analyze a computational model of indirect reciprocity in which information sharing is conducted
groupwise. In our model, individuals play social dilemma games within and across groups, and the information
about their reputations is shared within each group. We show that evolutionarily stable ingroup favoritism
emerges even if all the players use the same reputation assignment rule regardless of group (i.e., a single
standard). Two reputation assignment rules called simple standing and stern judging yield ingroup favoritism;
under these rules, cooperation with (defection against) good individuals is regarded as good (bad) and defection
against bad individuals is regarded as good. Stern judging induces much stronger ingroup favoritism than does
simple standing. Simple standing and stern judging are evolutionarily stable against each other when groups
employing different assignment rules compete and the number of groups is sufficiently large. In addition, we
1
ar
X
iv
:1
20
7.
56
63
v2
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
8 N
ov
 20
12
analytically show as a limiting case that homogeneous populations of reciprocators that use reputations are
unstable when individuals independently infer reputations of individuals, which is consistent with previously
reported numerical results.
Conclusions: Our results suggest that ingroup favoritism can be promoted in indirect reciprocity by the
groupwise information sharing, in particular under the stern judging assignment rule.
Background
Behavioral nature of humans depends on the economy of reputations, where praise and blame often lead to
gain and loss of material benefits [1, 2]. Humans, among other animals, cooperate via indirect reciprocity,
which involves cooperation beyond pairwise relationships [3–6]. In indirect reciprocity based on
reputations, an individual acquires a good reputation by behaving cooperatively in apposite situations.
The cost of maintaining a good reputation is compensated for by other individuals’ future cooperation
toward the individual possessing the good reputation. Indirect reciprocity has been extensively studied in
both theories [5–19] and experiments [2, 20–23].
Another facet of human cooperation is that an individual often cooperates with members in the same
group and not with others, a phenomenon called ingroup favoritism [24–33]. Ingroup favoritism poses a
puzzle for the theory of cooperation because it is usually not Pareto efficient; i.e., the payoff to an
individual in the case of ingroup favoritism is smaller than that in the case of group-independent all-out
cooperation. In addition, an individual implementing ingroup favoritism is worse off than an individual
defecting against both ingroup and outgroup members unless a specific assumption is imposed. In fact,
known mechanisms for stable ingroup favoritism (e.g., correlation between altruistic traits and phenotypic
tags [34–36], incomplete observability of tags [37], combination of mutation of tags and limited
dispersal [38]) are, in our view, complicated. Otherwise, stable ingroup favoritism requires an additional
mechanism (e.g., intergroup conflict [39,40]) that is capable of stabilizing cooperation on its own.
If maintaining a good reputation is a concern, why do individuals want to discriminate between
ingroup and outgroup fellows? One of the present authors has shown that ingroup favoritism is
evolutionarily stable in various situations when only group-level reputations are available in regard to
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outgroup members [41]. In the model, an individual’s action changes the individual’s reputation in the eyes
of the ingroup members, and the action also changes the reputation of the group to which the individual
belongs. It was revealed that the action rule of individuals (i.e., the strategy depending on the reputation
of the coplayer) toward ingroup and outgroup members and the reputation assignment rule (also called the
social norm) used for evaluating ingroup and outgroup interactions, or at least the latter, must
discriminate between ingroup and outgroup members for stabilizing ingroup favoritism. An example is a
rule whereby cooperation toward outgroup members is frowned upon, whereas the same behavior toward
ingroup members leads to a good reputation. Consistent with this theoretical example, Yamagishi and
colleagues had conducted behavioral experiments suggesting that ingroup favoritism occurs because
subjects anticipate that the reputation mechanism is functional only inside the group [25–27,29,33]. These
theoretical and experimental results suggest that double standards, in terms of the action rule or the
reputation assignment rule, may underpin ingroup favoritism.
In the context of indirect reciprocity, group structure may play a crucial role in spreading reputations
of individuals via rumor and gossip. In general, individuals interact more frequently with ingroup members
than with outgroup members [42]. Therefore, rumor and gossip may enable sharing of reputations of
individuals more smoothly within a group than between different groups. Most theoretical studies of
indirect reciprocity have assumed that information sharing and interactions occur randomly in a
well-mixed population. Otherwise, individuals are assumed to not exchange information about reputations
[7, 10,13,19].
In the present study, we explore a scenario of ingroup favoritism without resorting to rules that apply
double standards. In practice, humans may not differentiate between ingroup and outgroup coplayers with
regard to their action rules or reputation assignment rules. We analyze a group-structured model of
indirect reciprocity, in which an individual’s reputation is shared by each group but not between groups.
We study the case in which all the players use the same reputation assignment rule and the case in which
players in different groups use different reputation assignment rules. We show that ingroup favoritism can
emerge when players simply implement reputation-based decision making and do not favor ingroup
members. Because of the assumed groupwise information sharing and some reputation assignment error,
ingroup and outgroup members tend to possess good and bad reputations, respectively, without further
assumptions. In particular, ingroup favoritism is strong when individuals adopt a reputation assignment
rule called stern judging, under which helping bad individuals is regarded as bad.
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Methods
Model
We consider an infinitely large population of players divided into M (≥ 2) groups. Each group is assumed
to contain the equal fraction, 1/M , of players. In the population, players are involved in sufficiently many
rounds of the so-called donation game. In a one-shot donation game, two players are randomly selected
from the population, one as donor and the other as recipient. We assume that the donor and recipient
belong to the same group with probability θ. The donor cooperates (C), i.e., provides help, or defects (D),
i.e., refrains from helping, depending on the donor’s action rule and the recipient’s reputation (good (G) or
bad (B)). Action C imposes cost c (> 0) on the donor and results in benefit b (> c) imparted to the
recipient. Action D does not change the payoff to either the donor or recipient. A donor adopting action
rule ALLC cooperates with any recipient. A donor adopting action rule ALLD defects against any
recipient. A donor adopting action rule DISC cooperates with G recipients and defects against B recipients.
To know a recipient’s reputation, the donor consults the unique information source, called the
observer, that is shared by the group to which the donor belongs. Therefore, players in different groups
may perceive different reputations (i.e., G or B) of the same player. The observer in each group
independently assigns a reputation to the donor and shares it with the other players in the observer’s
group. Observers intend the predefined reputation assignment toward a donor’s action but may assign a
reputation opposite to the intention. The M observers independently commit such assignment error with
probability µ ( 1). In the example of intragroup interaction shown in Fig. 1, all the three observers
intended to assign G to the donor, and one observer erroneously assigned B to the donor. If the assignment
error occurs, the “wrong” reputation is shared by all the players in the group to which the observer belongs.
Observers assign reputations according to a common reputation assignment rule unless otherwise
stated. We principally compare three rules: image scoring (IM), simple standing (ST), and stern judging
(JG) [5,6,10–12,14,18], symbolically shown in Fig. 2. Among the three rules, IM is the simplest rule under
which observers assign G and B to a donor that has selected C and D, respectively. ST and JG are
simplest among the so-called “leading eight” reputation assignment rules that stabilize cooperation in
well-mixed populations [11,12]. Under ST and JG, the new reputation of the donor depends on the action
of the donor (i.e., C or D) and the reputation of the recipient (i.e., G or B). When a recipient has a G
reputation, observers assign G and B to a C and D donor, respectively, under both ST and JG. When a
recipient has a B reputation, observers assign G to a D donor under both rules. The two rules are different
in that helping bad individuals (i.e., a donor’s C with a B recipient) is appreciated (i.e., G imparted by the
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observer) under ST, whereas the same action of the donor is punished (i.e., B imparted by the observer)
under JG; JG is sterner than ST [1,18].
After sufficiently many rounds of the donation game involving reputation updates, the reputation
distribution in the eyes of each group-specific observer reaches a unique equilibrium. In the equilibrium, we
measure the quantities of interest such as the fractions of G players, the probability of cooperation, and
their dependence on groups.
Analysis Methods
Equilibria of the reputation dynamics
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the symbols used in this section.
We examine the stability of a homogeneous population of DISC players. Each player bears a
reputation vector, r = (r1, r2, . . . , rM ) ∈ {G,B}M, in the eyes of M observers, each representing a group.
We denote by pk(r) the probability that a player in group k has reputation vector r. By adopting the
formalism developed by Ohtsuki & Iwasa [11], we obtain the following reputation dynamics:
d
dt
pk(r) = −pk(r) +
∑
r′∈{G,B}M
{θpk(r′) + (1− θ)p−k(r′)}
M∏
k′=1
Φrk′ (σ(r
′
k), r
′
k′). (1)
The summation on the right-hand side of Eq. (1) represents the average over the recipient’s reputation
vector r′. With probability θ, a game involves a donor and a recipient in group k, and the recipient has
reputation vector r′ with probability pk(r′). With probability 1− θ, a donor and a recipient belong to
group k and another group, respectively, and the recipient has reputation vector r′ with probability
p−k(r′) ≡
∑M
k′=1,k′ 6=k pk′(r
′)/(M − 1). σ(r′k) represents a donor’s action toward a recipient having
reputation r′k. Because we assume DISC donors, σ(G) = C and σ(B) = D. The reputation assignment rule
is essentially given by Φrk′ (σ(r
′
k), r
′
k′) ∈ {1− µ, µ}, which is the probability that an observer in group k′
assigns reputation rk′ to a donor in group k. This probability depends on the donor’s action σ(r
′
k) toward
a recipient having reputation r′k′ in the eyes of the observer in each group k
′. In Tab. 2, we list the Φ
values under different assignment rules. It should be noted that all the observers use a unique assignment
rule unless otherwise stated; we do not basically assume that observers employ different assignment rules
as in previous studies [10,15,16,18,19].
We reduce Eq. (1) to mean field dynamics of two reputation distributions. First, we apply summation∑
r−k ≡
∑
r1
∑
r2
· · ·∑rk−1∑rk+1 · · ·∑rM to both sides of Eq. (1) to obtain the reputation dynamics in
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the eyes of ingroup observers as follows:
d
dt
pin(r) = −pin(r) +
∑
r′∈{G,B}
{θpin(r′) + (1− θ)pout(r′)}Φr(σ(r′), r′), (2)
where pin(r) ≡
∑
r−k pk(r) and pout(r) ≡
∑
r−k p−k(r) are the probabilities that a player has reputation
r ∈ {G,B} in the eyes of ingroup and outgroup observers, respectively. The two terms inside the curly
brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (2) correspond to the two situations shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b).
With probability θpin(r
′), the recipient belongs to the donor and observer’s group, and has reputation r′
(Fig. 3(a)). With probability (1− θ)pout(r′), the recipient does not belong to the donor and observer’s
group, and has reputation r′ (Fig. 3(b)).
Second, by applying summation
∑
r−` ≡
∑
r1
∑
r2
· · ·∑r`−1∑r`+1 · · ·∑rM , where ` 6= k, to both sides
of Eq. (1), we obtain
d
dt
pk(r`) = −pk(r`) +
∑
r′k∈{G,B}
∑
r′`∈{G,B}{
θpk(r
′
k, r
′
`) + (1− θ)
[
1
M − 1 p`(r
′
k, r
′
`) +
(
1− 1
M − 1
)
p−k`(r′k, r
′
`)
]}
Φr`(σ(r
′
k), r
′
`),
(3)
where pk(r
′
k, r
′
`), p`(r
′
k, r
′
`), and p−k`(r
′
k, r
′
`) are the probabilities that a player in group k, group `, and a
group other than k and `, respectively, has reputation r′k and r
′
` in the eyes of observers in groups k and `.
By approximating the three probabilities by pin(r
′
k)pout(r
′
`), pout(r
′
k)pin(r
′
`), and pout(r
′
k)pout(r
′
`),
respectively, we obtain the mean-field reputation dynamics in the eyes of outgroup observers as follows:
d
dt
pout(r) = −pout(r) +
∑
r′∈{G,B}
∑
r′′∈{G,B}{
θpin(r
′)pout(r′′) + (1− θ)
[
1
M − 1 pout(r
′)pin(r′′) +
(
1− 1
M − 1
)
pout(r
′)pout(r′′)
]}
×
Φr(σ(r
′), r′′).
(4)
The three terms inside the curly brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. (4) correspond to the three
situations shown in Fig. 3(c), (d), and (e). With probability θpin(r
′)pout(r′′), the recipient belongs to the
donor’s group, which differs from the observer’s group, and has reputation r′ and r′′ in the eyes of the
donor and observer, respectively (Fig. 3(c)). With probability (1− θ)[1/(M − 1)]pout(r′)pin(r′′), the
recipient belongs to the observer’s group, which differs from the donor’s group, and has reputation r′ and
r′′ in the eyes of the donor and observer, respectively (Fig. 3(d)). With probability
(1− θ)[1− 1/(M − 1)]pout(r′)pout(r′′), the recipient belongs to a group different from the donor’s and
observer’s groups, and has reputation r′ and r′′ in the eyes of the donor and observer, respectively
(Fig. 3(e)).
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By setting dpin(r)/dt = dpout(r)/dt = 0 in Eqs. (2) and (4), we identify stationary points that are
candidates of stable equilibria of the reputation dynamics. We examine the conditions detJ > 0 and
Tr J < 0, where J is the Jacobian matrix, at each stationary point to identify all the stable equilibria. We
confirmed that the stable equilibrium denoted by p∗in(r) and p
∗
out(r) is unique under each reputation
assignment rule.
Stability against invasion by ALLC and ALLD mutants
We check the evolutionary stability of a homogeneous population composed of DISC players against
invasion by an infinitesimal fraction of mutants adopting ALLC or ALLD. The payoff to a DISC resident
player is given by
piDISC = (b− c) [θp∗in(G) + (1− θ)p∗out(G)] , (5)
and those to ALLC and ALLD mutants are given by
piALLC = −c+ b
[
θpCin(G) + (1− θ)pCout(G)
]
(6)
and
piALLD = b
[
θpDin(G) + (1− θ)pDout(G)
]
, (7)
respectively. In Eqs. (6) and (7), pCin(G), p
C
out(G), p
D
in(G), and p
D
out(G) represent the probabilities that the
mutants selecting C and D acquire G reputations in the eyes of ingroup and outgroup observers, and are
given by
pain(G) =
∑
r′∈{G,B}
{θp∗in(r′) + (1− θ)p∗out(r′)}ΦG(a, r′)
and
paout(G) =
∑
r′∈{G,B}
∑
r′′∈{G,B}{
θp∗in(r
′)p∗out(r
′′) + (1− θ)
[
1
M − 1p
∗
out(r
′)p∗in(r
′′) + (1− 1
M − 1)p
∗
out(r
′)p∗out(r
′′)
]}
×
ΦG(a, r
′′),
where a = C or D. The population of DISC players is stable against invasion by ALLC and ALLD mutants
if
piDISC > max {piALLC, piALLD} . (8)
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Cooperativeness
DISC donors cooperate exclusively with G recipients. Therefore, in each stable equilibrium, the probability
of cooperation, which we call the cooperativeness, toward ingroup and outgroup recipients is given by
p∗in(G) and p
∗
out(G), respectively. The cooperativeness for the entire population is given by
ψ ≡ θp∗in(G) + (1− θ)p∗out(G). (9)
Measurement of ingroup bias
To quantify the degree of ingroup bias, we measure the difference between ingroup and outgroup
cooperativeness, defined by
ρ ≡ p∗in(G)− p∗out(G). (10)
When ρ ≈ −1, players basically cooperate with outgroup recipients and defect against ingroup recipients,
implying outgroup favoritism. When ρ ≈ 0, players equally likely cooperate with ingroup and outgroup
recipients. When ρ ≈ 1, players cooperate with ingroup recipients and defect against outgroup recipients,
implying ingroup favoritism.
Results
Table 3 summarizes the results obtained under the three reputation assignment rules. It shows the stable
fractions of G players in the eyes of ingroup and outgroup observers (i.e., p∗in(G) and p
∗
out(G)), the stability
conditions, cooperativeness (i.e., ψ), and the degree of ingroup bias (i.e., ρ).
IM
Under IM, the equilibrium fractions of G players in the eyes of ingroup and outgroup observers are both
equal to ψ = 1/2. Therefore, ingroup favoritism does not occur, i.e., ρ = 0. Furthermore, the population of
DISC players is invaded by ALLC mutants such that it is unstable. This result is consistent with the
established result that cooperation is usually unstable under IM because observers do not distinguish
between selfish defection (i.e., D against G recipients) and justified defection (i.e., D against B
recipients) [1, 8, 10,43].
ST
Under ST, DISC players almost always cooperate with ingroup recipients, i.e., p∗in(G) = 1− µ. This result
is consistent with the previous results in which ST enables perfect cooperation when a population does not
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possess group structure (corresponding to M = 1) [11,12].
The fraction of G players in the eyes of outgroup observers is given by
p∗out(G) = 1− µ
1 + θ
θ
+O(µ2). (11)
Therefore, DISC players almost always cooperate with both ingroup and outgroup recipients unless θ is
small (i.e., ψ = 1− µ/θ +O(µ2)). Because donors defect slightly more often against outgroup than ingroup
recipients, weak ingroup favoritism occurs (i.e., ρ = µ/θ +O(µ2)).
Equations (5), (6), and (7) yield the payoff differences given by
piALLC − piDISC = µ
θ
[b(1− θ)− c] +O(µ2) (12)
and
piALLD − piDISC = −(b− c) +O(µ). (13)
Therefore, the stability condition (Eq. (8)) reads
1 <
b
c
<
1
1− θ . (14)
ALLC mutants invade DISC players if b/c > 1/(1− θ). The cooperation is stable up to a large value of b/c
when ingroup interaction is frequent (i.e., large θ). ALLD mutants invade a DISC population under a
trivial condition b/c < 1.
JG
Under JG, DISC players have the same cooperativeness toward ingroup recipients as under ST, i.e.,
p∗in(G) = 1− µ. This result is consistent with the previous results in which JG enables perfect cooperation
when a population does not possess group structure (corresponding to M = 1) [11,12].
The fraction of G players in the eyes of outgroup observers is given by
p∗out(G) =
1
2
. (15)
Therefore, DISC players cooperate with outgroup recipients with probability 1/2. In contrast to the case of
ST, frequent intergroup interaction considerably reduces cooperation under JG (i.e., ψ = (1 + θ)/2 + µθ).
The degree of ingroup bias under JG is given by ρ = 1/2− µ, which is independent of θ. DISC players
show a significant level of ingroup favoritism, even though they simply use the reputations without
intending to discriminate recipients by the group identity.
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The payoff differences are given by
piALLC − piDISC = −1− θ
2
[
b
Mθ − 1
M − 1 + c
]
+O(µ) (16)
and
piALLD − piDISC = −1
2
[
b
1 + (M − 3)θ +Mθ2
M − 1 − c(1 + θ)
]
+O(µ). (17)
The stability condition reads
(M − 1)(1 + θ)
1 + (M − 3)θ +Mθ2 <
b
c
<
M − 1
1−Mθ if 0 ≤ θ <
1
M
,
(M − 1)(1 + θ)
1 + (M − 3)θ +Mθ2 <
b
c
if
1
M
≤ θ ≤ 1.
(18)
The DISC population is resistant to invasion by ALLC mutants when θ ≥ 1/M , i.e., when ingroup
interaction occurs more frequently than in the case of unbiased random pairing. When θ < 1/M and
b/c > (M − 1)/(1−Mθ), ALLC mutants invade the population of DISC players. When
b/c < (M − 1)(1 + θ)/[1 + (M − 3)θ +Mθ2], ALLD mutants invade the population of DISC players. The
cooperation is stable down to a small value of b/c if ingroup interaction is frequent (i.e., large θ) or the
number of groups (i.e., M) is small. In the limit M →∞, Eq. (18) is reduced to b/c > 1/θ, which coincides
with the results obtained from a previous model with infinite groups [41].
Under both ST and JG, in particular JG, ingroup favoritism emerges. This is because the donors
(equivalently, ingroup observers) and outgroup observers generally perceive different reputations of the
same player due to the assignment error (see Figs. 1, 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e)). For example, if a donor defects
against a recipient whose reputation is B in the eyes of the donor’s group members, the donor receives a G
reputation from the ingroup observer. However, if the same recipient has a G reputation in the eyes of the
outgroup observer, the outgroup observer assigns B to the donor under ST and JG. As another example, if
a donor cooperates with a recipient whose reputation is G in the eyes of the donor’s group members, the
donor receives G from the ingroup observer. However, if the recipient has a B reputation in the eyes of the
outgroup observer, the outgroup observer assigns B to the donor under JG. As these examples suggest,
different groups may perceive the opposite reputations of the same players in a long run. Players in the
same group coordinate the subjective information about a given player’s reputation, whereas those in
different groups do not. This discrepancy causes ingroup favoritism.
Numerical Results
We compare the theoretical results with numerical results obtained from individual-based simulations in
Fig. 4. The procedure of the numerical analysis is described in Appendix A. The analytical and numerical
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results are sufficiently close to each other in terms of both cooperativeness (Fig. 4(a)) and ingroup bias
(Fig. 4(b)).
We also examine the error-prone case in which donors fail to help recipients (i.e., select D when the
donors intend C) with probability  [9]. The numerical results for  = 0.01 and 0.1 are shown in Fig. 5. The
error reduces cooperativeness (Fig. 5(a)) and ingroup bias (Fig. 5(b)) under both ST and JG (see Fig. 4
for the error-free case). Nevertheless, the results with the error are qualitatively the same as those without
the error.
Mixed Assignment Rules
We have shown that JG leads to strong ingroup favoritism, whereas ST does not. To examine the
transition between the two regimes, we consider an assignment rule denoted by MX, which is a mixture of
JG and ST. In a one-shot game under MX, observers independently assign reputations by using JG with
probability α and ST with probability 1− α. Therefore, ΦG(C,G) = 1− µ, ΦG(D,G) = µ,
ΦG(C,B) = αµ+ (1− α)(1− µ), and ΦG(D,B) = 1− µ. Parameter α controls the degree of sternness with
which observers assign B to donors that cooperate with B recipients. ST and JG correspond to α = 0 and
α = 1, respectively. We numerically solve Eqs. (2) and (4) under MX.
The results under MX are shown in Fig. 6. Sternness gradually decreases cooperativeness (Fig. 6(a))
and increases ingroup bias (Fig. 6(b)) for different values of M and θ. The results interpolate those for ST
and JG and imply that sternness promotes ingroup favoritism. The shaded parameter regions in
Fig. 6(c)–(f) indicate the values of α and b/c for which DISC residents are stable. Above (below) the
shaded regions, ALLC (ALLD) mutants invade the DISC population. In all the cases, the upper and lower
bounds of the stability region in terms of b/c increase with α. A decrease in M induces cooperativeness
and reduces ingroup bias. A decrease in M also broadens the stability regions if θ is large. An increase in θ
induces cooperativeness, reduces ingroup bias, and broadens the stability regions for the following reason.
When θ is large, players are largely involved in ingroup interactions. Then, they do not suffer from a B
reputation that outgroup observers may frequently attach to the donor because of the discrepancy between
players’ reputations perceived by different groups (see subsection JG in Results for related discussion).
Heterogeneous Assignment Rules
We have assumed that all the groups use a common reputation assignment rule. In this section, we
numerically examine a case in which observers in different groups use different reputation assignment rules.
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We consider a situation in which m (1 ≤ m ≤M − 1) groups use JG and M −m groups use ST. The
procedure of the numerical analysis is described in Appendix B.
Numerically obtained equilibria with M = 8 and M = 20 are shown in Fig. 7(a) and (b), respectively.
As the number of JG groups (i.e., m) increases, the cooperativeness (ψST and ψJG for ST and JG groups,
respectively) decreases, and ingroup bias (ρST and ρJG for ST and JG groups, respectively) increases.
Figure 7(c) and (d) shows the difference between the payoff to a player in a ST group and that to a player
in a JG group (i.e., piJG − piST) when M = 8 and M = 20, respectively. When the benefit-to-cost ratio is
small (i.e., b = 2), piJG − piST is positive. Therefore, if observers update their assignment rules according to
an evolutionary dynamics (e.g., group competition [16]), the evolutionary dynamics would lead to a
homogeneous population in which all the observers adopt JG. When the benefit-to-cost ratio is large (i.e.,
b = 6), piJG − piST is positive when m is large and negative when m is small. This implies that a
homogeneous population of ST and that of JG are bistable under evolutionary dynamics. The basin of
attraction for the homogeneous ST population in terms of m broadens as b increases. When the
benefit-to-cost ratio takes an intermediate value (i.e., b = 4), the results for M = 8 (Fig. 7(c)) and those
for M = 20 (Fig. 7(d)) are qualitatively different. For M = 8, piJG − piST is negative only when m = 2 or 3.
Therefore, a stable mixture of ST and JG groups and a homogeneous population of JG are bistable. For
M = 20, a homogeneous population of ST and that of JG are bistable.
Discussion
In the present study, we showed that ingroup favoritism emerges in a group-structured model of indirect
reciprocity. In our model, players share information about reputations in each group but not across
different groups. We assumed that a player’s action purely depends on the coplayer’s reputation; players do
not refer to the group identity of the coplayers or use other types of prejudice. We also assumed that
observers impartially assess ingroup and outgroup donors. We analyzed the model using a mean-field
approximation and numerical simulations. Ingroup favoritism occurs under both simple standing (ST) and
stern judging (JG) assignment rules. The cooperativeness is reduced by the frequent intergroup
interactions, i.e., small θ. The ingroup bias is severer and the cooperativeness is smaller under JG than
under ST. The parameter region for the stability of the cooperative equilibrium is larger under JG than
under ST. Under ST and JG, a population of discriminators is evolutionarily stable if the probability of
ingroup interaction (i.e., θ) is sufficiently large. If θ is small, the population is invaded by unconditional
cooperators and unconditional defectors under ST and JG, respectively. We also studied the case in which
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observers may adopt different assignment rules in different groups. We found that JG would dominate ST
in evolutionary settings when the benefit-to-cost ratio is small. Otherwise, the homogeneous population in
which all the groups employ ST and that in which all the groups employ JG are bistable in large parameter
regions.
Different mechanisms govern ingroup favoritism in our model and that observed in psychological
experiments [24–33]. In the latter, players use a cue that indicates the group identity of the coplayer and
preferably cooperate with ingroup members. In our model, players do not refer to the group identity of the
coplayer. They show ingroup favoritism because they perceive that outgroup members have bad
reputations more often than do ingroup members.
We implemented the group structure by controlling probabilities of ingroup and outgroup interactions
(i.e., θ and 1− θ, respectively) and assuming the groupwise information sharing. In terms of the structure
of information sharing, most previous theoretical studies of indirect reciprocity are classified into two types:
public [5, 6, 8, 9, 11,12,14–17,41] and private [7, 10,13,17,19] reputation models.
In public reputation models, all the players have access to a common information source that provides
the reputation values of the players. Therefore, a donor and observer perceive the same reputation of a
recipient such that they do not suffer from the discrepancy of reputations. In public reputation models
without group structure of the population, ST and JG realize evolutionarily stable cooperation [11,12].
This result is consistent with ours because, in the limit θ → 1, Eqs. (14) and (18) are reduced to a trivial
condition b/c > 1 such that the population of discriminators is stable under ST and JG.
In private reputation models, each player individually collects others’ reputations such that a
reputation of a player varies between individuals. In contrast to the case of public reputation models, a
homogeneous population of discriminators is invaded by unconditional cooperators in private reputation
models. A mixture of discriminators and unconditional cooperators is often stable under variants of
ST [7,10,13,19]. Under variants of JG, a population of discriminators is invaded by unconditional
defectors [17,19] (but see Ref. [13]), or discriminators and unconditional cooperators are frequent in an
island model if dispersal of offspring is confined within each island [10]. In the limit θ → 0 and M →∞,
our model can be interpreted as a private reputation model. In this situation, the population of
discriminators is unstable because Eqs. (14) and (18) are violated. Therefore, the results obtained from our
model in this limit are consistent with the previous results.
For intermediate θ and M values, our model uses a public reputation scheme within each group and a
private reputation scheme across groups. In this sense, the structure of information sharing in our model is
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situated between public and private reputation models.
One of the present authors previously studied a model of ingroup favoritism on the basis of indirect
reciprocity [41], which we refer to as the multiple standard model. The multiple standard model and the
model analyzed in the present study are different in two aspects. First, in the multiple standard model, a
given player’s reputation is made public to different groups such that the problem of coordination in regard
to reputations among different groups does not exist. In the present model, observers in different groups
may differently perceive a player’s reputation, which leads to the coordination problem. Second, in the
multiple standard model, observers are allowed to use different rules to assign reputations to ingroup and
outgroup members. Similarly, donors may use different action selection rules toward ingroup and outgroup
recipients. Then, ingroup favoritism of different degrees emerges. Consider a situation in which the action
rule is of a single standard such that donors are discriminators toward both ingroup and outgroup
recipients. Then, at most partial ingroup favoritism in which players always cooperate with ingroup
members and partially (i.e., with probability 1/2) cooperate with outgroup members is evolutionarily
stable. Consider another situation in which the action rule is of a double standard such that donors are
discriminators toward ingroup members and unconditional defectors toward outgroup members. Then,
perfect ingroup favoritism in which players always cooperate with ingroup members and always defect
against outgroup members is evolutionarily stable. In the present model, observers use a single-standard
reputation assignment rule, and donors use a single-standard action rule. Then, partial ingroup favoritism,
but not perfect ingroup favoritism, can be evolutionarily stable.
Group competition models of indirect reciprocity were previously studied [15,16]. In references [15,16],
the authors numerically examined competition between different assignment rules employed in different
groups. In our terminology, they assumed that the donation game is played inside each group and that
reputations are updated exclusively by ingroup observers under the public reputation scheme. They
showed that JG (stern-judging in their terminology) emerges in the course of evolutionary dynamics based
on group competition and individual selection. Their models and ours are fundamentally different although
both studies have stressed the importance of JG. First, they assumed group competition and we did not.
Second, they mainly focused on competition between different assignment rules and we did not; we only
studied the special case in which observers in different groups adopt either of ST or JG. Third, we
determined the possibility of ingroup favoritism and group-independent cooperation. In contrast, their
model is not concerned with ingroup favoritism because interaction between a donor and recipient in
different groups is not assumed.
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Uchida and Sigmund analyzed competition between assignment rules by using replicator
dynamics [18]. In their model, a player selected as donor uses the public information source corresponding
to the assignment rule that the player adopts. For example, if the surviving assignment rules are only ST
and JG (SUGDEN and KANDORI, respectively, in their terminology), there are two public information
sources. Although their model is apparently a public reputation model, the players can be interpreted to
belong to one of the groups defined by the assignment rule; members in each group share a common
information source and use the same assignment rule. Helping a recipient having a bad reputation in the
eyes of both ST and JG groups is assessed to be good by the ST group and bad by the JG group.
Therefore, JG players assess ST players to be bad more often than they assess JG players. Because this
tendency is strong enough, ingroup favoritism occurs in the JG group. Their model and ours are consistent
with each other because, when different groups can adopt different assignment rules, both their model and
ours with sufficiently many groups predict bistability between ST and JG. Their model and ours
complement each other in the following respects. First, they investigated competition between assignment
rules, whereas we mainly studied the case in which all the groups share an assignment rule. Second, they
assumed a well-mixed population, whereas we varied the frequency of ingroup and outgroup interactions.
Third, they studied competition among at most five groups (i.e., five assignment rules), whereas we
assumed a general number of groups.
Conclusion
To explore the possibility of spontaneous ingroup favoritism in indirect reciprocity, we analyzed a social
dilemma game in a population with group structure. We showed that the degree of ingroup bias depends
on the reputation assignment rule. In particular, considerable ingroup favoritism occurs under the so-called
JG assignment rule, whereby observers assign bad reputations to players helping bad players. Ingroup
favoritism has been considered to be an evolutionary outcome [25–27,29,33]. The present work supports
this general idea. To measure the dependency of ingroup bias on the assignment rule in behavioral
experiments may be an interesting challenge.
Appendices
A Numerical methods in the case of the homogeneous assignment rule
We prepare a population of N = 103 DISC players divided into M groups of equal size. We consider an
N ×M reputation matrix, denoted by R = (ri,`), where ri,` ∈ {G,B,U} represents the reputation of player
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i (1 ≤ i ≤ N) in the eyes of the observer in group ` (1 ≤ ` ≤M). U represents the unknown reputation.
We assume that all the entries of R are equal to U in the beginning of a run. In a one-shot donation game,
we randomly select a player i as donor. Then, with probability θ/(N/M − 1), we select a recipient j(6= i)
that is in the donor’s group. With probability (1− θ)/(N −N/M), we select a recipient j that is in a
group different from the donor’s group. When determining the action, the donor refers to rj,k, where k is
the donor’s group. We assume that the donor cooperates when rj,k = U. After the game, the observer in
each group ` (1 ≤ ` ≤M) assigns a new reputation to donor i such that ri,` = G with probability
ΦG(a, rj,`) and ri,` = B with probability 1− ΦG(a, rj,`), where a ∈ {C,D} is the donor’s action and
ΦG(a, rj,`) under each assignment rule is defined in Tab. 2. When rj,` = U, we assume that the observer
uses IM; ΦG(U,C) = 1− µ and ΦG(U,D) = µ. We set µ = 0.01.
After repeating T = 105 rounds of the donation game, we calculate the fraction of G players in group
k in the eyes of the observer in group `, which is given by Φ∗k,`(G) =
∑N
i=1; player i in group k δ(ri,`)/(N/M),
where δ(G) = 1 and δ(B) = δ(U) = 0. The fractions of G players in the eyes of ingroup and outgroup
observers are given by Φ∗in(G) =
∑M
k=1 Φ
∗
k,k(G)/M and Φ
∗
out(G) =
∑M
k=1
∑M
`=1, 6`=k Φ
∗
k,`(G)/[M(M − 1)],
respectively. By substituting these quantities in Eqs. (9) and (10), we obtain ψ and ρ. We average ψ and ρ
over 102 runs of the simulation.
B Numerical methods in the case of the heterogeneous assignment rule
To analyze heterogeneous populations, we assume that observers in groups 1, 2, · · · ,m adopt JG and those
in groups m+ 1,m+ 2, · · · ,M , adopt ST. By applying the procedure explained in Appendix A, we obtain
the fraction of G players in group k in the eyes of the observer in group `, i.e., Φ∗k,`(G). The probability
that a donor in group k helps a recipient is given by
ψk = θΦ
∗
k,k(G) + (1− θ)
1
M − 1
M∑
`=1, 6`=k
Φ∗`,k(G). (19)
The probability that a recipient in group k is helped by a donor is given by
φk = θΦ
∗
k,k(G) + (1− θ)
1
M − 1
M∑
`=1, 6`=k
Φ∗k,`(G). (20)
The ingroup bias of the players in group k is given by
ρk = Φ
∗
k,k(G)−
1
M − 1
M∑
`=1, 6`=k
Φ∗`,k(G). (21)
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The payoff to the players in group k is given by
pik = −cψk + bφk. (22)
The cooperativeness, ingroup bias, and payoff to the players in groups employing JG and ST are defined by
QJG =
∑m
k=1Qk/m and QST =
∑M
k=m+1Qk/(M −m), respectively, where Q represents either ψ, ρ, or pi.
We average these quantities over 102 runs for each parameter set to generate Fig. 7.
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Figure 1: Behavior of different observers in different groups (M = 3).
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Figure 2: Three reputation assignment rules. Image scoring (IM), simple standing (ST), and stern
judging (JG). The rows represent the donor’s actions (i.e., C and D), the columns represent the recipient’s
reputations (G and B), and G and B inside the boxes represent the reputations that observers assign to the
donor.
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Figure 3: Five possible situations of the reputation update. Observations are made by ingroup
observers in (a) and (b), and by outgroup observers in (c), (d), and (e).
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Figure 4: Equilibria for a population of DISC players under ST and JG. (a) Cooperativeness (ψ)
and (b) ingroup bias (ρ). We vary the assignment rule (ST or JG), the number of groups (M = 2 or 10),
and the probability of ingroup interaction (θ). The lines represent theoretical results shown in Tab. 3. The
symbols represent numerical results.
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Figure 5: Equilibria for a population of DISC players under action implementation error. (a)
Cooperativeness (ψ) and (b) ingroup bias (ρ). We fix the number of groups (M = 10) and vary the
assignment rule (ST or JG), the probability that a donor fails to help a recipient ( = 0.01 or 0.1), and
the probability of ingroup interaction (θ). The lines represent theoretical results when  = 0 and are the
replicates of those shown in Tab. 3. The symbols represent numerical results.
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Figure 6: Equilibria and the stability conditions for a population of DISC players under MX.
(a) Cooperativeness (ψ) and (b) ingroup bias (ρ). In (a) and (b), we set (M, θ) = (2, 0.6), (∞, 0.6), (2, 0.2),
and (∞, 0.2). (c)–(f) Stability conditions. The homogeneous population of DISC players is stable in the
shaded parameter regions. We set (c) (M, θ) = (2, 0.6), (d) (M, θ) = (∞, 0.6), (e) (M, θ) = (2, 0.2), and
(f) (M, θ) = (∞, 0.2).
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Figure 7: Equilibria for a population of DISC players under heterogeneous assignment rules.
(a), (b) Cooperativeness (ψST and ψJG) and ingroup bias (ρST and ρJG) for groups employing ST and JG.
(c), (d) Payoff difference between a player in a ST group and that in a JG group (piJG − piST). We set
θ = 0.6 and c = 1. We also set M = 8 in (a) and (c), M = 20 in (b) and (d), and vary the number of JG
groups (i.e., m) and b.
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Tables
Symbol Meaning
M Number of groups
θ Probability that a donor and recipient in a one-shot game are in the same group
r ∈ {G,B}M Reputation vector of a player in the eyes of M observers
pk(r) Probability that a player in group k has reputation vector r
p−k(r) Probability that a player outside group k has reputation vector r
σ(r) ∈ {C,D} Donor’s action to a recipient having reputation r ∈ {G,B}
Φr(a, r
′) Probability that an observer assigns reputation r ∈ {G,B} to a donor selecting action
a ∈ {C,D} to a recipient having reputation r′ ∈ {C,D}
pin(r) Probability that a player in the eyes of an ingroup observer has reputation r
pout(r) Probability that a player in the eyes of an outgroup observer has reputation r
Table 1: Meaning of symbols.
Rule ΦG(C,G) ΦG(D,G) ΦG(C,B) ΦG(D,B)
IM 1− µ µ 1− µ µ
ST 1− µ µ 1− µ 1− µ
JG 1− µ µ µ 1− µ
Table 2: Probability that an observer assigns G to a donor. ΦG(a, r) represents the probability that
a donor receives G when the donor selects action a ∈ {C,D} and the recipient has reputation r ∈ {G,B}.
The donor receives B with probability ΦB(a, r) = 1− ΦG(a, r).
Rule p∗in(G) p
∗
out(G) Stability condition ψ ρ
IM
1
2
1
2
Unstable
1
2
0
ST 1− µ 1− µ1 + θ
θ
+O(µ2) Eq. (14) 1− µ
θ
+O(µ2)
µ
θ
+O(µ2)
JG 1− µ 1
2
Eq. (18)
1 + θ
2
− µθ 1
2
− µ
Table 3: Equilibria and the stability conditions for a population of DISC players under different
assignment rules.
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